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This paper elaborates equilibrium properties of contract labor
markets when cost barriers limit labor mobility in response to demand
and productivity shifts. Unemployment is sustained because the marginal
value of labor is not equated across all firms; however the equilibrium
contract optimally allocates a worker's time between market and noninarket
uses, given transactions cost—mobility constraints. Contracts provide
full unemployment insurance for risks that are diversifiable by pooling
among firms. Nondiversifiable (macro) risks are only partially shifted,
largely through self—insurance (contingency saving). Increasing diversi—
fiable risk has social value, similar to the value of an option. Increasing
nondiversifiable risk has negative value because it reduces lifetime con-
sumption. The main empirical implication of contract theory is shown to
be closely related to the permanent income hypothesis and establishes
linkages between labor activities and consumption behavior. It is a
theory of consumption rigidity rather than wage rigidity. Another empirical
implication is that unemployment incidence is proportional to comparative
advantage in norunarket production. Layoffs are ordered by workers' relative
productivity in norimarket compared with market sectors. The theory is used
to analyze some features of the U.S. employment system. Its empirical
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This paper analyzes equilibrium in labor markets characterized
by stochastic environments and transactions cost barriers to labor
mobility, bbthof which lend social value to enduring employment
relationships. Instantaneous wage competition plays little economic
role in allocating workers to firms in these circumstances. Instead
firms compete for workers through long term attachments and implicit
contractural commitments which specify a worker's employment status
and consumption in each state of the world.1 Patterns of wage payments
serve a redistributive role of transferring workers' consumption claims
across states, a function not at all performed by wages in a standard
market. The competitive contract sustains unemployment because dif-
ferences in marginal products of labor across firms persists in equilib-
rium. The contract provides complete consumption insurance when risks
are diversifiable over the economy at large. Full unemployment compensa-
tion is efficient and level consumption is guaranteed in all states of
nature, because risks can be shifted and redistributed at no social cost.
Nondiversifiable macro risk must be self—insured, since these risks are
not so easily shifted. Self insurance necessarily is incomplete because
it must be accomplished through contingency savings, which require the
equivalent of inventory holdings that reduce average per capita consumption.
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The practical interest of models of this type is related to their
value in explaining employment fluctuations and certain typesof unemploy-
ment. Its possible relevance is strengthened by recent empirical findings
that most adult workers in the U.S. economy (and elsewhere) have long—term
attachments with their employers, and that a large fraction of layoffs
are temporary, with workers ultimately returning to employmentin their
primary firms.2 My goal is to spell out the complete implicationsof a
simple form of the theory, to delimit its range of applicability,and to
better inform empirical work on this topic. This development points to
integrating consumption behavior with employment and unemployment activity
as an important focus of future empiricalresearch. I show that the
theory of implicit contracts is intimately related to the permanentincome
theory of consumption. The theory also has some novel implicationsabout
the incidence of unemployment. It has less implications about wage
rigidity than in commonly believed.
The basic framework of analysis considers an economyin which a
single consumption good is produced in eitherof two sectors. One is
home production,. where a worker acts independent of all others.The
other is a market sector where the worker is employed as onemember
among many of a competitive firm which producesand sells in the market.
A firm is viewed as a collective and voluntary association, a typeof
club or mutual assurance society that acts in the best interestsof its
members.3 Each firm is characterized by a production function and an
organizational (set—up) cost which is shared among itsmembers. The
value of production in the firm is stochastic, while thevalue of home
production is deterministic.3
The model makes no distinction between work and leisure. A person
works in either the market sector or at home. Home production may be
given the interpretation as the value of leisure, if the reader prefers,
though it is assumed that whatever is done in the nonmarket sector is
perfectly substitutable with the market good. This simplification has
certain expository virtues: it allows me to concentrate on alternative
production possibilities of a single good rather than analyzing complex
joint production—consumption allocations among goods. Furthermore, it
implies that work in the home or market sector is an all—or—nothing
affair. It thus allows firms' employment policies to take the form of
layoffs. Indivisibilities and set—up costs in either production or labor
supply are required to generate layoffs in the standard economic model
and are difficult to handle. The one—good assumption,while unrealistic,
therefore has some realistic implications that are more than justified
on the basis of analytical tractability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II derives the
contract market equilibrium, assuming homogeneous workers and fully
diversifiable risk among the firms. The latter implies that aggregate
output is essentially deterministic. Risk averse workers gain from
divorcing consumption from the day to day fortunes of their particular
firms, and a social arrangement can be found to exploit these gains.
It takes the form of an insurance or mutual fund in which firms in
effect pool their stochastic outputs into an aggregate deterministic
sum and withdraw equal shares. This simple point is the bare essence
of the theory of implicit contracts. Insured consumption implies a
form of real wage rigidity and the simultaneous existence of layoffs,4
which are among the basic data to be explained. Comparativestatics
of the basic model are worked out in section III which derives a
surprising implication that the value of firm specificrisk is positive.
Section IV examines the incidence of unemployment and layoff policies
among heterogeneous workers. The optimum layoffpolicy is shown to be
ordered on workers' comparative advantage in the home compared tothe
market sector. However, contracts may be subject to the problemof
adverse selection. Section V extends the model to include common, non—
diversifiable or macro risk. Since these risks cannot be pooled,self
insurance rather than market insurance is shown to be the optimal response.
Section VI uses the model to analyze some features ofofficial unemploy-
ment compensation schemes. The argument is summarizedin the context
of existing empirical work in section VII. The reader maywish to
start with that section to get the general flavorof the results before
getting into the details.
II. THE OPTIMALITY OF UNELOThENT INSURANCE
This section illustrates the basic ideas and resultsin the simplest
possible way. Market equilibrium is analyzedassuming that all workers are
identical in both preferences and production opportunitiesand that there
is no macro uncertainty. Envision a competitivemarket with a large number
of firms in which the value of production ineach firm is subject to
random shocks. The shock, which itself gives rise tothe possibility of
gains from contracts, can be thought of as anindependent draw with replace-
ment from an identically distributed urn.There are so many firms that an
unlucky draw by one is sure to be counterbalanced by alucky one by another.5
In effect the entire distribution is realized among all firms together, so
the average shock is zero for all practical purposes. This is the most
favorable case for analyzing an insurance arrangement because all risk is
completely diversifiable under these circumstances.
The structure of production, preferences and contracts is discussed
in section II.A. Competitive equilibrium in the labor market is derived.
in section II.B. Complete insurance is:shown to be the optimal and competi-
tive market solution to the contracting problem. Some properties of the
solution are discussed in section II.C, and modifications required for the
introduction of a temporary labor market as well as a contract market are
set forth in section II.D.
A. Construction of the Model
1. Technology. A worker eriploved in the nonmarket (home) sector
produces k units of the consumption good. This output is not traded and
is self—consumed as it is produced. All workers have identical skills.
The technology of each firm in the market sector is described by
a production function x =sf(m),where x is output, m is labor services
employed during the period, and s is a nonnegative independent and
identically distributed random variable affecting total factor productivity.
f(m) is strictly concave: f'(m) >0and f"(m) <0.In addition, each firm
pays an (amortized) set up cost of b, shared among all members. The good
x is traded in the market. Establishing a collective market organization
obligates its members to take a drawing out of the distribution of s in
each period. Total factor productivity s is distributed as G(s) for each
and every firm. G(s) is the fraction of firms who realize total factor
productivity no larger than s, and is known to all agents. Furthermore,6
tokeep the analysis as straightforward as possible7 there is no private
information. All members of the firm, and indeed all membersof the
economy, have costless knowledge of thevalue of s drawn by any particular
firm, should they choose to learn it.
2. Contracts. Upon gaining membership in a firm, a worker is
entitled to a wage payment of w(s) if s is drawn and the firm's employment
policy requires the person to work at the firm. Onthe other hand, the
firm may make a payment of w(s) if s is drawn and the worker is laidoff
and sent home to work in the nonmarket sector. The payment w(s) is temporary
severance or layoff pay. It is a form of unemployment compensation.Notice
that payments are conditioned on s, which is feasible because ofcostless
state verification and public information: everybody observes sat each firm.
The firm has access to a competitive insurance market,
possibly the government, which enables it to buyinsurance at actuarially
fair rates. Hence it need not meet contractual obligationsw(s) and
w(s) out of current sales. In good states wage payments areless than
sales because some receipts are paid as insurance premiums. In poor
states it collects an indemnity: total payout to membersexceeds
sales. Total receipts of the insurance company always, equal total payout,.
and all of its obligations are fulfilled with certainty. Thisis feasible
by virtue of no macro uncertainty and costless stateverification. Alter—
natively and equivalently, the insurance arrangementcould be rationalized
as a muthal fund in which every firm owns a shareof the market portfolio
of other firms.In each period the entire output is claimed by the
mutual, with remittances back to each firm sufficient to meetits
contractualobligations.7
Labor services employed by the firm are also contingent upon the
state: rn(s) =p(s)n,where n is the firm's labor force (membership) and
P(s) is the fraction of the membership who are employed. 1p(s) is the
unemployment rate of the firm in state s. It is also the layoff rate in
state s.In distinction to an auction market equilibrium, transport
costs require workers to confront lotteries when contemplating market
activity. The state of nature cannot be known in advance, and instantaneous
arbitrage is too costly. Should a low state be drawn, it may be preferable
for a fraction 1 —pof workers to engage in nonmarket production rather
than market production. It niay be prefereable for all members of the
firmtoengage in market production when a high state is drawn. Consequently
0.p(s) .l.
3. Preferences. All workers are risk averse and have identical
strictly concave preferences in consumption, u(c), with u'(c) >0and
u"(c) <0.For employed persons c(s) =w(s),and for unemployed persons
c(s) =k+ w(s). Wage payments, unemployment pay, and home production are
all identified with consumption. Perfect substitution betweenmarket and
nonmarket production justifies this equivalance.
B. Competitive Equilibrium.
Labor immobility rules out organized labor market exchanges as
viable economic institutions. Equilibrium must bedescribed instead as
competition among firms for members; that is to say, bycompetition for
labor market contracts. Competition for workers (members) guarantees
that the equilibrium contract maximizes expected utilityof a representative
person in each firm, subject to the aggregateconservation laws in the
overall economy that total output is constant.8
Expected utility of a worker is
(2.1) Eli =f[p(s)u(w(s))+ (l—p(s))u(k + (s))]dG.
It is convenient to bypass the insurance market in evaluating the firm's
constraint. The conservation law for the mutual fund requires that
expected production of each firmmustcover the organizational set up
costs and contractual consumption obligations it has made to its members
Expected: profit for each firmmustbe nil. Thus
(2.2) f{sf(p(s)n) —np(s)w(s)—n(l—p(s)(s)JdG=b.
Theoptimalcontract defines functions w(s), p(s), p(s) and a membership
n that maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.2): the market solution may be
found as a simple optimization problem. Let A be the Lagrange multiplier
associated with constraint (2.2). 1 shall not carry along explicit
multipliers on nonnegativity and other constraints, since these will
be clear in context. Since s is observed by everyone, all contract
features (other than n) are state dependent, in principle. The optimum
policy is found by differentiation, state by state, under the integral sign.
1. Optimal Wage and Unemployment Compensation. Differentiate (2.1)
along with constraint (2.2) and associated multiplier A, with respect to
w(s) and i(s) to obtain marginal conditions for wages and unemployient pay
(2.3) EU/w(s) =[u'(w(s))—Anip(s)=0
(2.4) EU/(s) ={u'(k+ (s)) —AnJ(l—p(s))=0.
Recalling that consumption c is identical with income, (2.3) and (2.4) imply
u'(c) =Anis independent of s. Therefore, both w(s) and p(s) are indepen—9
dent of s. This is a fundamental result. It says that consumption condi-
tional on employment or unemployment status is independent of the (condi-
tional) state s. It is an immediate consequence of risk aversion. More-
over, (2.3) and (2.4) imply an even stronger result: u'(w) =u'(k+ i).
Thisimplies w =k+ w for all s. Workers demand full insurance and no
macro uncertainty means that full insurance is feasible.
The key result is that consumption is independent of the state of
the world and employment status. Level consumption is shared among all
persons in the economy. This clearly bears a resemblence to the permanent
income hypothesis. As a corollary, the worker is indifferent to home or
market production. Unemployment, in the sense of home production, is
voluntary in this model when unemployment insurance is complete.
2. Optimal Employment Policy. State independence of consumption
and wages simplifies the objective function to
(2.5) EU =u(k+ )+A{f[sf(p(s)n) —n—p(s)nk]dG—b}.
Differentiate (2.5) with respect to p(s):
(2,6) DEU/p(s) =nX[sf'(p(s)n)—kJ.
The first term in the bracketed expression is the marginal product of labor
in state s. The second term is the opportunity cost of labor in home
production. The firm uses the real social opportunity. cost of labor to
calculate its optimal layoff policy, not the actual wage or unemployment
compensation. However, account must be taken of the constraint 0p(s) 1.
For a given membership n, (2.6) implies that the internal shadow supply curve
of labor services to the firm appears as in figure 1.It is infinitely10
elastic at the nonmarket opportunity cost k up until p(s) =1,at which point
it becomes completely inelastic because all members are fully employed,
and additional workers are not available due to transactions costs.The




It is apparent from figure 1 that the optimum employment policyis
dependent upon s and follows the form
p(s) =0, for s sf'(O) < k
(2.8) 0 < p(s) < 1, for s < s < s sf' (p(s)n) =k
p(s) =1, for s > sf'(n)> k.
All available workers are employed if the shock is sufficiently large (s s).
All members are laid off and the firm temporarily shuts down if the shock is
sufficiently small (ss). In between some fraction of the membership is
employed, and the other fraction is unemployed. The firm's unemployment
rate (1 —p(s))is decreasing in s.
3. Optimum Membership in the Firm. The result in (2.8) allows
the integral in (2.5) to be broken up and written as
S
(2.9) EU =u(w+ k) +X{![sf(pn)—pnk]dG+ ![sf(n) —nk]dG—n—b}11
where the dependence of p on s has been suppressed to economize on notation.
Differentiating (2.9) with respect to n and continually exploiting marginal
conditions (2.8) yields
(2.10) EU/n=X{f[sf'(n)—k]dG— = 0
5
(2.11) a2EU/an2 =ft1(n)fsdG< 0.
S
Negativity of (2.11) implies that (2.10) defines a local maximum. Assume
in all that follows that k is sufficiently small relative to the mean value
of sf'(m) that it pays to supply some work to the market sector and not
specialize in home production (i.e., that it pays to become a member of
a firm).




(2.13) w =!sf'(n)dG+ fkdG
0
The equilibrium wage paid to employed members equals the expected marginal
product of labor in both home and market sectors. The wage is the expected
value of the maximum of home productivity and market productivity of a
worker. The indemnity paid to the unemployed is the expected surplus value
of a unit of market labor at full employment.
Equation (2.12) defines an equilibrium relationship betweenand n.
Substituting (2.12) and (2.13) into (2.2) and simplifying yields12
S
(2.14) V(n)f[sf(p(s)n) —np(s)k]dG+ [f(n) —nf'(n)]!sdG =b
S
where p(s) is defined by optimality conditions in (2.8).Differentiating V(n)
with respect to n yields V/n =—nf"(n)fsdG,which is positive. Further—
S
more, urn V =0.Therefore the equality in (2.14) must hold at some
positive value of n. Strict concavity of f(m) requiresb > 0 if the firm
is to be of nontrivial size. Nonzero b lends anelement of increasing
returns to work in the market sector, analogous to u—shaped average
cost curves in conventional theory. It pays toform a group to economize
on fixed set up costs b and share them with othermembers. It is easy
to show that n is increasing in b: the larger the set up coststhe greater
the incentive to share them among more coworkers.
C. Competitive Euilibrium Is Pareto Optimal
The assumption of perfect substitution between market and nonmarket
production makes it easy to calculate the Pareto optimaldistribution of
employment and firm membership. Market production perfirminstate s s
sf(pn) and home production per firm is (1 —p)kn.The number of firms is
N/n, where N is the size of the population. Therefore, per capitaincome
in the population is
I ={!.[sf(Pn)+(1—p)nk)dG—b}/n
Maximizing I with. respect to P(s) yields conditions identical to (26) and
(2.8), and maximizing it with respect to a yields a condition identical
with (2,14). Therefore competition for contracts achieves Pareto optimality.13
Equivalence between competition and social efficiency is in any case clear
from the fact that there are no extenalities in this problem as formulated,
and the firm uses the correct opportunity cost of labor in calculating p(s).
It is important to notice, however, that the contract. solution is
not efficient relative to a full auction market equilibrium that would occur
in the absence of transaction costs. The reason for this is that the con-
tract equilibrium does not equate the marginal product of labor across all
uses. To be sure, the marginal product of labor is equated to home produc-
tivity within firms for which 0 <P(s)<1.But firms which have drawn
large values of s display marginal productivities in excess of k and also
different from each other: marginal product is not necessarily equated
between firms. If moving resources around the economy were costless
it would pay to shift labor out of home production and away from low demand
firms and move it to firms which have high demand. Costs of mobility
do not make it worthwhile to arbitrage these differences. Hence the
contract solution is Pareto optimal relative to positive transport costs,
not to an unattainable equilibrium that would emerge were there no
transport costs. This departure from the standard optimality conditions
(equal marginal product everywhere) represents a perfect index of unemploy-
ment in this economy. It shows that some market imperfection or trans-
actions cost is a necessary condition for unemployment in competitive
equilibrium.
It should also be pointed out that the solution shown above differs
from most of the literature. Most previous writers have arbitrarily con-
strained unemployment compensation to be zero. But if market work is
inherently more productive than home production, which must be the typical
state of affairs, it is optimal for i> 0.It is also feasible, at least14
for the iid, diversifiable part of firms' risks. Arbitrarily setting w=0
leads to erroneous results and conclusions.
To see the precise difference between the two solutions, solve
the constrained maximum problem above with the additional constraint
=0.Letting A' be the multiplier associated with constraint (2.2)the
condition for w(s) remains similar to (2.3):
(2.16) p(s)fu'(w(s)) —X'n]=0.
Equation (2.16) shows that the wage is a constant in all states given
that the person is employed. The difficulty is that this wage is not
necessarily equal to k. The marginal product of p(s) in the w =0
constrained problem is, after some simplification
(2.17) EU/p(s) =-u(w)-u(k)-sf'(p(s)n). u (w)
Here the term =(u(w)—u(k))/u'(w)is interpreted as a risk premium,
the amount of consumption a person would be willing to give up to increase
the probability of employment. Approximatingin Taylor's series up to
second order yields
(2.18) w -= k-(r/2)(k—w)2<k
where r is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The situation is
analogous to that depicted in figure 1, except now the firm acts as if
the opportunity cost of labor is w —up to the full employment level
instead of k. But (2.18) shows that w —is less than the true opportunity
cost of labor, k. Therefore a firm that cannot offer unemployment compen—15
sation inefficiently overemploys its labor force. All workers as a whole
would be better off if market production was a bit smaller and homepro-
duction was a bit larger. That is, unemployment is not large enough in
the no unemployment compensation equilibrium.4
In the world in which we live insurance is not complete because it
cannot be provided at actuarially fair premiums. The insurancecompany
must ascertain whether an adverse event has occurred, claims must be
verified and settled, premiums must be collected, and so forth. Inshort,
the rates charged must cover the costs of providing insurance. It isan
elementary proposition that risk averse agents do not buy full insurance
when the load factor is positive;, nor is it socially optimum for them
todo so. In that (realistic) case a contract equilibrium doesnot
provide complete insurance either. Workers bear some residual risk of
unemployment. Following the logic above, unemployment is not voluntary
——itis involuntary since workers are better off (in the sense of a
larger consumption standard) while employed. The shadow price of labor
is somewhat smaller than k, with the difference reflecting the risk
premium due to the difference in consumption between employed and unemployed
states. Employment is somewhat excessive relative to the case were insurance
actuarially fair. Nonetheless, coverage is pushed to the limits of its cost
and the tendency toward consumption equalization remains, though it is not
quite complete. Since the effects of nonactuarial insurance premiums on
the solution are clear enough, I shall largely ignore them in the interest
of analytical simplicity, even though they provide more realism in the
analysis. Readers can supply these qualifications as desired.16
Much has been made in the literature of presumed rigidity in wages
implied by the optimal contract. I believe this emphasis is misplaced.
The proper implication and prediction is that the optimal contract makes
consumption independent of both the state of nature and employment status.
This is really a theory of permanent consumption. Thus the inefficiency
resulting from constrainingto zero is really due to a constraint on
the worker's ability to transfer consumption claims from employed to
unemployed states. This is the reason that employment is excessive in
that case. Excessive employment is an imperfect substitute for insurance
and if insurance is feasible and available at cost, it should be complete.
Some may argue that the optimal solution appears artificial, not
the constrained one. After all, private unemployment insurance is not
widely observed as a main feature of labor market contracts. An easy
response is that most data and experience refer to periods when official
unemployment compensation has been the rule rather than the exception.
But there is a more fundamental answer. The optimal contract determines
consumption in each state of the world and there is a sense in which
the actual wage is indeterminate. Thus consider a temporal version of
the model described above. Then GNP and total employment follow a
constant, zero—growth path. The overall unemployment rate is constant
too. As the problem has been written, the market for state contingent
claims has been short—circuited by allowing the firm to buy insurance on
the worker's behalf. It is transparent that having each worker transact
in that market is conceptually equivalent. The firm would not make
a payment to the unemployed. The wage paid to each employed worker would
exceed the worker's consumption, with the difference going to an insurance
company as the actuarial premium. The worker would collect the indemnity17
himself to maintain consumption while unemployed. Barring transactions
costs in the insurance market such a scheme is a perfect substitute for
the one stated above. The point is that it is consumption that is
"downwardly rigid.," It is also "upwardly rigid." Once a market for
state contingent claims is considered, this kind of model says very little,
if anything, about rigidity of wage payments. It of course says nothing
whatsoever about nominal wage rigidity since all necessary primitives in
this model are in real terms. If consumption rigidity is identified
with wage rigidity, it is real wage rigidity that is predicted by a
contract, not money illusion.
This discussion should clarify the intimate connection
between an intertemporal version of this model (Baily, 1974) and the
static version (Azariadis [1975]). Both models are logically equivalent
when there is no macro uncertainty, but it is something of a misnomer to
characterize the intertemporal version by savings and dissavings behavior.
With no uncertainty in the economy at large, total consumption equals total
output arid aggregate saving is zero. Those workers in firmswho have
experienced a lucky draw (positive "savings") in effect subsidize those
who have experienced an unlucky draw (negative "savings"). They are
willing to do so because they are sure to need a subsidy at some time
in the future. It is inefficient for aggregate savings to be positive
because consumption is reduced below the maximum sustainable level.
Thus, if one wants to describe this kind of scheme as contingency
saving, the market clears when aggregate saving and the rate of interest
are zero. The situation is altered when macro uncertainty is present.18
D. Simultaneous Contract and Auction Markets
The model considered above has been structured on the assumption
that transaction costs of seeking out alternative job prospects when laid
off exceed the returns from search. For completeness, an intermediate
case is sketched where transactions costs are positive but not so large
as to preclude working on an alternative jobwhen laid off, rather than
in thenonniarket sector.
Supposethe round trip transport costs of seeking out another
job are T > 0. I implicitly assumed above that (T) was infinite.
Think Ofaneconomy with the same technology and stochastic structure as
before, except now the labor market may allow a certain dual structure.
Each worker remains a primary member of a firm, but finite T allows exis-
tence of a market for temporary labor. A worker laid off from primary
employment may enter the temporary labor market during the period,
after which he returns to the primary firm before s is drawn again. Let
the market clearing wage in the temporary labor market be .
Contractdetails in the prmary firm remain unchanged, with wage
w paid to employed primary members and unemployment insurance payments
of w to laid off members. The net wage received in the temporary market
is T. Evidently the condition required for someone to participate in
the temporary market rather than in the home sector is+ k w + —T,
or k + T.If the inequality is strong there is never any unemployment
(home production), so the interesting case is k + T. This defines
the reservation price and level of the elastic supply curve to the
temporary labor market. Consumption is again identical whether the
worker is employed at home, in the primary market, or in the temporary
market: w =w+ k =w+ —r,assuming actuarial insurance rates.19
Let T(s) denote temporary employees hired by the firm in state s.
The constraint becomes
ffsf(pn + T) —wpn—(l—p)n—T]dG=b.
Upon substituting the inequalities for w, ,andabove, this reduces to
(2.19) ![sf(p(s)n + T(s)) —knp(s)—(k+ T)T(s) —n]dG=b.
Since the worker consumes+ k with certainty, the optimum contract deter-
mines functions p(s), nand T(s) that maximize utility u( + k) subject to
(2.19). Differentiation reveals that
ETJIap(s)nX[sf'(p(sn) +T(s))—kJ
EU/T(s)=A[sf'(p(s)n+T(s)) —(k+ 'r)J.
Theseshow that the supply curve of labor to the firm is a step function,
illustrated in figure 2. The first step refers to primary employees, for
which the appropriate shadow price is k. To this is appended the incre-
mental supply of temporary employees, the second step, at reservation
price k + T.Now there arethree critical values of s: s and s defined
above, anddefined by f'(n) =k+ T.The optimum employment policy
thereforehas the following features: when s <s the firmtemporarily
shuts down.Fors < s < s the firmemployspermanent members only,
o<p(s)<1, and p(s)isdetermined by equality of marginal product with
k.For s between s and ,p(s)=1and all permanent members are fully
employed. Temporary employment is zero. Finally, for s >all permanent
members are fully employed and the firm hires temporary help up to the
pointwhere the marginal product of labor equals k + T.20
Given this characterization of employment, the integral in the
constraint may be broken into these same intervals of s. Differentiation
with respect to n and simplification yields the analogue of (2.12)
A
S
(2.20) f[sf'(n) —k}dG+ !TdG.
S S
Figure 2 reveals thatis increasing in T. Therefore (2.20) approaches
(2.12) as T tends to infinity. Derived demand for temporary laborimplicit
in figure 2 yields a deterministic aggregate across firms, from which it
is easily verified that the temporary market actually clears at wagek + T,
and (2.20) holds in market equilibrium.
Comparative statics reveals that
< 0, 3w/ST > 0, and n/T > 0.
These results are explained by the fact that temporary mobilityof labor
promotes efficiency (greater national income) and that mobilityis lessened
by greater transport costs. The market is more efficient whenT <because
the marginal product of labor is equated among a subset of firms with
larger values of s. Remaining inefficiency is reduced to that analogous
to "gold points" among firms with intermediate drawings of s.The fact
that w and w fall with T is directly attributable to lower per capita
income and consumption as t increases. Firm size grows as T rises because
substitution with temporary labor is more expensive. Unemployment rises
with T because the probability of finding alternative temporary employment
is reduced: the auction labor supply schedule is shifted upward and the
level of activity in that market is reduced.21
While it is strictly speaking outside the scope of the model, it
is useful to relate this to the timing of shocks s. A longer horizon is
appropriate if shocks are of a slower moving, longer frequency variety.
Effective T falls because transport costs are amortized over a longer
period. This increases supply to the temporary market and reduces
unemployment. If the shocks are of a more temporary character, T effectively
increases and unemployment rises because it is not worthwhile to move. A
similar hueristic interpretation can be given in the presence of serially
correlated firm disturbances (given no common component). However, the
temporary market becomes more and more permanent as the persistence of
the firm shock increases, so the interpretation of a firm as a voluntary
"club" with permanent attachment loses its appeal and virtue. Persistent
shocks are analogous to changes in relative demands and have not been
modeled here.5
III. COARATIVE STATICS
Comparative static propositions are readily found from the reduced
system (2.12) and (2.14). To simplify I shall assume that T is infinite
and ignore the temporary labor market. Details, but not the qualitative
nature of the results are affected by this assumption. Relevant
exogenous parameters are k, b, and properties of the distribution G(s).
Each is considered in turn, assuming complete contractual insurance.
A. Changes in Home Productivity (k)






Furthermore, since (3.2) is nothing more than the negativeof the expected
employment rate, it follows that 0 >/k>—1.Using the equality of
consumption across states, w =w+k,
(3.3) w/k =fdG + 1(1 —p(s))dG>0
0
and it follows that 0 <w/k<1.
Firm size increases as home productivity k rises, from(3.1). The
supply schedule of labor to the firm in figure 1shifts upward and the
inelastic section binds at a larger value of n. The fractionof the firm's
labor force employed for any realization of s never increasesand actually
falls for all values of s between s and(which themselves increase):
the equilibrium unemployment rate increases. The unemployment compensa-
tion payment falls (see (3.2)): market goods are relatively more expensive,
so production is smaller on average and smaller unemployment payments are
supported. Nonetheless, the wage paid while working rises (see (3.3)).
Because iiislarger, market production is larger in the more favorable
states so these payments can be sustained. Moreover, per capita consump—
tion rises (in all states) because production possibilities in theoverall
economy have improved: the value, of market productionhas remained unchanged
and the value of home production has increased. Therefore expected utility
rises. In sum, an increase in home productivity shifts production toward
the nonmarket sector thereby increasing the equilibrium unemployment rate.
Consumption and utility rise and workers are better off.23
B. Organizational Costs (b)
It already has been noted (see (2.14) and discussion) that an
increase in b increases firmsize.Given the value of k and the distribu-
tion of s,figure 1 implies that the equilibrium unemployment rate
rises. Workers must be worse off because in a sense production possi-
bilities have become less favorable. Nonmarket production possibilities
are unchanged but market production is more expensive. Per capita con-
sumption and utility fall. The comparative statics show that
=aw/ab=f"(n)(an/b)fsdG< o.
S
C. Mean Preserving Spread
Following Rothschild and Stiglitz {1970], parameterize the
distribution function as follows:
(3.4) dG(s; a) E g(s a) =h(s)+ ay(s)
where a is a positive number and y(s) is a mean preserving spread, a
step function that spreads weight into the tails of G(s) as a increases.
If y(s) is a mean preserving spread it must have the following properties,
by definition
5




!Y(v)dv>0 for s less than max s.
024
Substitute (3.4) into (2.12) and (2.14)and differentiate with respect to
a to obtain
(3.6) n(/a) f[sf(Pn) —pnkjy(s)ds.
0
Integration by parts reveals the signof this expression (see Diamond and




Marginal conditions (2.8) and figure 1 show that Q'(s) =0on (0, SI;
Q'(s)f(pn) on (s, ); and Q'(s) =f(n)for s >. Therefore,Q'(s) >0
for all s. In addition, Q"(s) =nf'(pn)(pIs)on (s, ) and Q"(s) equals
zero otherwise. Therefore Q"(s)0 for all s as well. Using (3.7) and
(3.5), integrating (3.6) by parts twice yields
5
(3.8) n(3/a) —fQ'(s)Y(s)ds =fQ"(s)[JY(dv)]ds 0.
0 0 0
Since Q" is nonnegative and the term in brackets is positive by definition,
w increases with the spread of the distribution G(s). w also increases
with spread because w =w+ k.6
Increasing riskraisespercapita coñsinnpcion aridimakes oepple
better off. The surprising conclusion that risk has positive rather than
negative value is related to the theory of option pricing. The opportunity
to work in the nonmarket sector with known values allows truncation of the
lower tail of i±e market productivity distribution. Increasing risk puts25
more weight in the tails and allows greater selectivity toward the more
favorable states of market productivity.
A similar development to the one above leads to the following
expression for the effects of risk on firm size:
S
!{f'(pn)(p/2s)[J'Y(v)dv1 —f'(n)Y(s)}ds
(3.9) an/aa —0 0
nf"(n)!sdG
S
The denominator is negative, but the numerator cannot be signed since both
terms in the integral are nonnegative. The effect on n depends on the
particular form of y(s). Therefore increasing risk may either increase
or decrease equilibrium unemployment.
These results assist in analyzing equalizing differences in
unemployment risk. They indicate that the problem is more complex than
appears on the surface. Consider two industries, both subject to stochastic
shocks, one with larger variance in its disturbance than the other. So long
as the shocks are independent and diversifiable, the optimum contract
specifies complete consumption insurance in both Industries. If workers
are found in both of them then expected utility must be equalized and mean
values of production must adjust to offset greater expected utility in the
high variance sector. Relative output prices change to make this so. The
risky industry in this sense is expanded beyond what it would be in the
absence of transactions costs and labor market contracts.
That the optimum contract offers complete insurance implies no
systematic sorting of workers by tastes to industries. A worker's
consumption is independent of location in equilibrium so there is no scope26
for risk aversion to affect the allocation of workers tomarket sectors.
Whether or not an equalizing difference is observedin wages depends on
whether the observed wage is net or gross of the insurance premium necessary
to sustain unemployment insurance payments. Equalizingdifferences are not
observed if these payments are made by the firm on theirworkers' behalf.
Even if workers make these payments themselves, failure to signexpression
(3.9) does not allow unambiguous predictions on whetherthe equalizing
difference with resoect to observed unemployment i positive or negative.
It is important to recognize the limited scope of thisresult.
Effectively we are dealing here with purely transitory, fullydiversifiable
risks. The statements above are confined to them alone.If insurance is
incomplete or if shocks are sufficiently permanent to induce workers to
move to other industries or firms, the picture is different.For example,
it is no longer true that allocation of workers to sectors is independent
of risk aversion. Rather, the least risk averse workers and those with
the greatest comparative advantage in the nonmarket sector are assigned
to the riskier firms. Still, this analysis indicates that equalizing
differences are sensitive to the precise nature of disturbances and to
precisely how risks are shifted and shared across the economy at large,
a point that seldom makes its way into discussion of this subject.
IV. THE INCIDENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Suppose now that there are two groups in the population, onewith
home productivity of k1 and the other with home productivity k2>
k1.
Assume the k—identity of workers is public information. Then one possible
labor market equilibrium is complete segregation of types within firms.
Firms of type 1 consist of only k1 members and firms of type 2 contain27
only k2 members. The comparative statics proves that workers in type 1
firms exhibit less unemployment and receive lower wages and larger
unemployment compensation than workers in type 2 firms.
A. Integration
However, there maybegains from integrating a firm and combining
worker types. For example, a type 2 firm might find it advantageous to
eliminate some of its members and take on some members of type k1. This
converts the internal supply function of figure 1 to the two—step function
illustrated in figure 3.The potential gain is that the k2 members can
better select their market working time toward states where market productivity
is especially large: in less advantageous states they can better exploit
their comparative advantage in the nonmarket sector and let the k1ts do
the work instead. This possibility is related to the option virtues of
increasing risk discussed above. It is also related to the economics of
peak load pricing. Workers with larger values of k may serve as reserve,
stand—by production capacity, to be called upon only when demand is
especially large. Notice that gains from integration are present only
when transactions costs make a club/contract equilibrium feasible. Inte-
gration or segregation among types is irrelevant if mobility is costless
and the marginal product of labor is always equated among firms.
When is integration advantageous? The simplest way to answer the
question is to assume a segregated equilibrium and ask whether someone
can organize -an integrated firm and make a profit by paying segregated
wages. If so, then complete segregation is not viable. Labor services
in such a firm are rn(s) =p1(s)n1+ p2(s)n2, where the subscripts denote
types of workers. Segregated wages are determined as above and satisfy28


















Equation (4.2) and figure 3 suggest four critical values of s in
an integrated firm. The marginal conditions for pt(s) are





p151and p2 =0 sf'(P1n1) =
(4.3)s1 <sS s2 p1
1 and p2 =0, k1 <sf'(n1)S
p11andO<P25i
s >s3 p1 == 1, sf'(n1 + n2) >k
Only when the state is more favorablethan s2 are k2 workers brought on
line and set toorkin the market sector. The termsin (4.3) are defined
in the obvious way by the equalities implicitin figure 3. Using those
intervals and differentiating (4.1) with respect to gives marginal










+ f[sf'(n1 + p2n2) —
k1JdG
Si S2
+f[sf'(n1 + n2) -k1}dG
-= 0.
S3
Examinefirst the possible size of this integrated firm. Let n









+ n2 is the size of the integrated firm, and 2 is the minimum
full employment value of s in a segregated firm. (4.6) indicates three
possibilities for n. Suppose n <n.Then s3 <and(4.6) is positive,
so n should grow. The firm cannot have less thann2 members. It cannot
have more than n2 members either. Otherwise 53 >s2and (4.6) is negative
and the firm should shrink. Therefore n =n,.in an integrated firm that
pays segregated wages (here s3s2 and (4.6) is zero, so the marginal
condition is satisfied). Intuitively, the reason for this is that workers
of type k2 are "marginal:" the extensive margin for membership is
determined as if the firm contained only k2 workers. Therefore the question
of integration comes down to determining whether or not it pays to
replace some k2Ts with an equal numberof k1tswhile keeping total membership
constant.
It is easy to verify that ETrin(4.1) is concave in n1 and n2 when
(4.3) holds. Therefore we only need inquire about the sign of E'lT/n130
near n1 =0to ascertain whether integration is profitable. Comparison of
figures 1 and 3 reveals that s1 =i'and s2 =atn1 =0so that
(4.7) Eir/n1 =f[sf'(O)—
k1]dG+ (k2 —k1)!dG+ —
w1)
*
wherethe derivative is evaluated at n =n2
and n1 =0.The first term
in (4.7) is the net value of market production contributed by an increment
of labor. The second' term is the incremental value of nonmarket production
achieved by replacing a worker of type k2 with a worker of type k1. The
third term is the added unemployment compensation expense required for a
type 1 worker over a type 2 worker.
Recall the comparative statics result above w/k =—!p(s)dG—
whereis the expected employment rate and<1.Therefore; write
—1)—a(k2
—
k1)with 0 <a 1. Substituting this into (4.7) shows
that a sufficient condition for profitability of integrated production is
1 —
C(s2)
>a.It always pays to integrate if C(s2) =0(i.e., a segregated
firm never shuts down). Other cases are much more complicated. Detailed
analysis shows that the profitability of integration depends onthe precise form
of G(s) in the interval (s1, s2). Integration may not pay if G(s) exhibits
sufficient weight in that region. Intuitively, the reason is that the segre-
gated k2 firm engages in so much home production in that case that substituting
a k1 does not release a sufficient amount of a k2's time to make it worthwhile.
B. Market Equilibrium
The equilibrium configuration of firms is determined by both the
profitability of integration (properties of C(s)) and the number of
workers of each type. There is a taxonomy of cases:31
1. Integration not advantageous. Here integration does not
increase per capita consumption. Each firm is segregated to own types.
k2 firms are larger, and their members enjoy greater per capita consumption.
They pay higher wages to employed members and lower compensation to unemployed
members. They also have larger unemployment rates than k1 firms.
2. Integration with k2 members in excess supply. Segregated and
integrated firms coexist. The former contain k2 members only. Wages and
consumption of k2Ts are determined by those paid in segregated firms. k1
workers earn rents attributable to the gains from integration. The unemploy-
ment rate of k2Ts is always larger than that of k1's. It is also larger in
integrated firms than in segregated firms, but k2 workers are indifferent
because their consumption is fully assured and idential in the two types
of firms. It can be shown that all firms are the same size, whether
integrated or not. This size is n2 because k2's are the marginal workers.
3. Integration, with k1 members in excess supply. Segregated
firms contain k1 types only. Now k2 workers capture all rents from integra—
don. While k1 workers exhibit greater unemployment rates in segregated
firms than in integrated ones, their wages, unemployment compensation, and
consumption are the same in either case. k2Ts still exhibit a larger
unemployment rate than do k1's. It can be shown that the equilibrium
size of integrated firms is less than n (since now k1Ts are the marginal
types). Segregated firms may be larger or smaller than integrated firms.
4. All firms integrated. This is a knife edge case in which the
fraction of types in the economy exactly matches the desired fraction in
integrated firms. The rents from integration are shared among both types,
but the rent shares are indeterminate.32
In all cases the incidence of unemployment is greatest among workers
exhibiting comparative advantage in nonmarket production, illustrating the
general principle that production should be allocated efficiently. Society
gives up less if workers with larger home productivity bear the brunt of
unemployment. Furthermore, high nonniarket productivity workers in integrated
firms display a type of employment and layoff behavior that is temporally
ordered, according to a "first fired, last hired" rule. Integrated firms
contain subclasses of reserve employees who come on line only in the best
possible states and who are sent home before other workers in bad states.
The employment policy is ordered so that lower home productivity employees
are only laid off after the pool of reserves has been exhausted. Notice,
however, that in distinction to the usual caricature, here type 2 workers
receive higher wages and consumption than others. This counter intuitive
result is explained by the fact that k2 workers are more valuable than
workers in the production of total income. Their inherent market skills
are the same, by assumption, and they are more skillful and valuable in
household production. Hence they are more productive overall.
Another parameterization is possible; for example, distinguish among
workers by market skill, but assume identical home productivity. Then
labor services may be written as m(s) =p(s)nz,where z is the parameter
describing efficiency of labor in market production. Reworking the results
reveals that the employment policy depends on comparing sf(m(s)) with klz
rather than with k. While some details vary, it is the comparative advantage
ratio k/z that is relevant for comparative statics. The effects of a change
in z are opposite in sign to those of a change in k. Given two types of
labor, z1 and z2, with z >z2,the same considerations as above apply to33
possibilities for integration. Given k, low skilled workers have the
comparative advantage in home production. They exhibit greater average
unemployment than high skilled workers, and serve the "buffer stock"
function in integrated firms. They are the first to be fired and the last
to be rehired. They also earn less than the more highly skilled workers
because they are less skilled. Yet it is comparative advantage k/z that
is the key parameter, not absolute advantage.7 For example, if k and z
are positively correlated then it is not so clear which group serves the
buffer function, and the employment policy is not ordered on z or k alone.
C. Adverse Selection
Equilibrium contracts require wage and employment discrimination
among workers with different values of k. The analysis so far has assumed
that each worker's nonmarket productivity is common knowledge. What
happens when k is not publically known? Do workers have incentives to
reveal their true values and self—select the proper categories? If not,
contracts are potentially subject to adverse selection and may not be
efficient. Assuming a self—selection equilibrium, it isnecessary to
ascertain whether members of one group privately gain by masquerading
as members of the other. If they do not then the equilibrium described
above is in fact the market equilibrium.
The analysis is easy when market equilibrium is completely segre-
gated. Consider the incentives of k1. Consumption isw1 =+k1 in all
states if the truth is told. Consumption is in employment states and
+ k1 in unemployment states if k1 passes himself off as ak2. Consumption
is larger in the unemployment state (sincew2 >w1)and less in the34
unemploymentstate (since w2 +k1




as the unemployment probability for a k2 in the separating equilibrium. k1
reveals the truth if expected utility ofw1 for certain exceeds expected
utility of the gamble (w2, w2 + k1; (1 —p2),p2). Since workers are risk
averse we need to compute the actuarial value of the gamble to ascertain
incentives for truthful revelation of k1.
The actuarial value of the gamble compared with truth telling is
A =p( +k1)+(1+ p2)w2 —







because w. =. + in the assumed equilibrium. We know from a result
above that w/k =—(1—p)<0.Furthermore,
=!(pIak)dG>0.
Hence the function (k) is convex. Writing again (w2 —w1)—c.(k2 —k1)
and






Convexity of w(k) implies a >(1—
p2)
——seefigure 4. Therefore A <0
and k1 does not gamble. A parallel argument fOr k2 shows comparable incen—35
tives for truth telling. Therefore self—selection is indeed the market
equilibrium and there is no cheating.
The analysis is significantly more complex when the market equilibrium
involves integrated production because of the existence of rents. Rents
to one group increase incentives for risk taking and lying on the part of
the other group and appear to increase possibilities for adverse selection.
A definitive answer remains to be given in these cases. It is clear from
the analysis in section EVA., however, that rents are increasing in (k2 —k1)
and also in the weight that G(s) places in the interval of realizations of
s above Hence if there is a problem of adverse selection, it is
a more probable outcome the greater the difference in home productivities
between groups. It is a less probable outcome the greater the weight of
G(s) in the interval i' s2). Also, it is less probable the greater the
risk aversion among workers.
V. MACRO-UNCERTAINTY
The analysis above has abstracted from aggregate disturbances.
Modifications required for aggregate risk that might resemble business
cycles are briefly considered in this section.
The simplest way of introducing aggregate risk is through a




where i refers to firms and t refers to time. Uer:e is an economy—wide
disturbance common to all firms in period t and is a firm—specific
component in period t of the type considered above.(A multiplicative
specification leads to no additional conceptual issues.)36
The fundamental implication of (5.1) is that market insurance can
be guaranteed only up to the firm specific component E.t.Luckyrealiza-
tions of p systematically shift the average worker toward market production
and away from home production. Therefore aggregate market consumption
available to be redistributed among all workers varies with p and any attempt
to fully insure all uncertainty (in the cross—section sensediscussed
above) exposes an insurance fund to the risk of bankruptcy.Perfect market
insurance is feasible only for the diversifiablecomponent of s. Risk
averse decision makers must use a form of self—insurance to copewith
aggregate risk p.
It is obvious that self—insurance must take the form of personal
savings and dissavings over time. This point is transparentwhen C0.
Then the law of large numbers applies only across time, and not atall
across firms. The conceptual framework appropriatefor that case is the
familiar model of intertemporal allocation of consumption and labor
supply imder uncertainty. Concavity of preferencesleads ..to the desir-
ability of smoothing consumption relative to income. Workersallocate
labor between market and nonmarket activities in proportion torealizations
of They must hold a stock of capital (e.g., an inventoryof goods) in
order to achieve a smooth consumption path. Stocks are built upin
periods of favorable realizations of u. Capital isconsumed when
realizations are unfavorable. Under general conditions regarding holding
•costs of contingency reserve capitalit is well known that complete
smoothing of consumption over time is not achieved. That is,it is
hardly ever optimal to hold capital at such a largelevel that the
probability of stock—out is zero.37
The fact that macro distrubances are not diversifiable across
firms but are diversifiable across time is the basis for advantageous
self insurance, which must take the form of contingency saving and
dissaving behavior.8 There are real social costs involved here:
the larger the variance of aggregate disturbances, the larger the
contingency stock required to reduce the variance of consumption risk and
the lower the expected per capita consumption. In distinction to the
positive value of increasing diversifiable risk analyzed above, increasing
aggregate risk definitely reduces expected utility and consumption and
has negative value. Nonetheless, the main empirical implication of macro
risk is very similar to that of idiosyncratic micro risk. Both imply
social arrangements that reduce fluctuations in consumption relative to
income. Both imply a form of the permanent income hypothesis. The fact
that self—insurance is incomplete (because of inventory holding costs)
suggests some residual influence of transitory income on consumption and
incomplete smoothing of consumption. This requires a slightly weakened
form of the permanent income hypothesis. Similarly, loading charges or
other imperfections that constrain complete insur.aitce ofdiversi—
fiable micro risk also imply some effects of transitories on consumption.
VI.UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
A. General Considerations
This section uses the model developed above to analyze certain fea-
tures of the U.S. unemployment compensation system (some of these features
are shared by systems in other countries.) In fact most unemployment
insurance observed in the world today is provided by governments, yet the38
model at our disposal is one where private contracts are optimal and cannot
be improved by public intervention. Since private supplements to public
programs are not extensive, nor were private schemes widely observed prior
to the inception of government programs, it is very unlikely that private
insurance was merely displaced and offset by public insurance. Therefore
some discussion of the scope and limitations of the present framework of
analysis is warranted.
Moral hazard and adverse selection are potential sources of
competitive market failure in the provision of insurance. They readily
explain why individual specific unemployment policies are not traded,
say in the manner in which life insurance policies are written. The
insured event ——unemployment——issubstantially under the control and
discretion of economic agents. An insurancecompany would have great
difficulty detecting actions that firms and workers undertake to affect
the probability distribution of unemployment status and couldnot vary
premiums conformably. Workers would not face the correct social costs
of their actions at the margin, leading to the problem of moral hazard.
The insurance company would also have difficulty assigning individualsto
appropriate risk classes, of separating inherent risks from tastes for
leisure and home productivity, leading to the problem of adverse selection.
These considerations explain why unemployment insurance must be
written at the level of the firm. The firm is the agent of workers in
regard to unemployment and layoff decisions. This is, after all, the
key insight of the theory of implicit contracts. Since the firm is the
proximate decision maker in these matters, considerable decentralization
and internalization of conflicting interests is achieved by making the39
firmpayfor its decisions. The firmhasthe correct incentives for
undertaking action if it pays the full costs at the margin of the risk
it imposes on the insurance fund. This will be so if premiums are geared
to actuarial experience. This is, in a sense, just a restatement of the
model described above. To be sure, incomplete information always implies
inisciassificationg and incomplete internalization in practice. But that
is true of all insurance. It is insufficient reason for a complete
breakdown of the market mechanism.
Therefore, I believe the rationale for the large role of the State
in these schemes must be found in other causes. Chief among them is the
inability of an insurance company to withstand large runs on the bank
attributable to connnon nondiversifjable risks associated with business
cycles (e.g., the variance component p in section V). For the same
reasons as were previously discussed, the company would have to hold
substantial excess reserves to reduce the risk of ruin and bankruptcy
to tolerable proportions. It is hard to imagine how private unemployment
insurance could have withstood claims payable in the Great Depression,
for example: state funds run substantial negative balances in recessions
even in very recent experience. The greater the excess reserves, the
smaller the insurance value and the closer the arrangement comes to
contingency savings rather than to true insurance. Capital market im-
perfections might then imply a large role for the state, but that is
beyond the scope of this article. Yet another cause lies in the fact
that employment contracts are often broken in the real world. Some con-
tracts are not permanent. Permanent demand shifts as well as technical
changes make it economically worthwhile to move resources to higher40
valued uses. Possibilities of bankruptcy of firms, which are not trivial
concerns in these circumstances, limit the liability a private insurer
can expect from those it insures. And, since after a contract ispermanently
severed the worker becomes his own agent for seeking out new contract
opportunities, decentralization and internalization virtues of insurance
contracts with firms are seriously diluted
We should stand on relatively safe ground in using this
model to analyze the- consequences of unemployment compensation schemes
for workers who are subject to long term contracts and who have more or
less permanent attachments with their firms. The analysis that
follows is best applied to those workers who face threats of temporary
layoff and ultimate recall. It has become increasingly apparent that
a large fraction of American workers essentially have long term contractual
relationships with their firms, perhaps as many as 50 percent of the
experienced male adult labor force (Hall [1981]). However, this class of
workers accounts for a muth smaller fraction of unemployed workers, many
of whom have permanently lost their jobs or who are either new entrants
or re—entrants into the labor force(Hall (1980)). It is still a plausible
conjecture that the two specific, features analyzed below carry over •to
most classes of workers.
B. Unfair Insurance and Income Tax Exemptions
Unemployment insurance in the United States, while difficult to
describe because of program. variations across the various states that
administer it, is based on relatively simple information and accounting
rules designed to be self—financing and informed by actuarial practices.
Premiums paid by a firm are increasing in the extent of prior claims by41
its employees. Systems of this sort are said to be "experience—rated.t'
However, thorough—going actuarial balance is not achieved because of
built—in implicit taxes and subsidies across risk classes. Firms
exhibiting systematically large claims (e.g., the construction industry)
are effectively subsidized by mandated ceilings on tax rates. Those with
systematically small claims are effectively taxed by mandated minimum pay-
ments. The federal government comes into the picture because UI benefits
are partially exempt from income taxation. This in itself promotes
excessive demand for temporary layoffs by contractural employees. The
supply of layoffs is increased in those firms receiving subsidies on their
premiums because layoffs impose costs Qflthesystem not borne by these
firms and also because the subsidy encourages entry into risky industries.
It is worth stressing that this kind of critique is addressed at repairing
program details and not at the question of unemployment insurance per Se.
We have already seen that full unemployment insurance is socially optimal
and that unemployment is actually too small when insurance is constrained.
The tax/subsidization features of the current system promote socially
excessive unemployment, which is far different from saying that unemploy-
ment insurance itself promotes excessive unemployment.
These factors can be introduced into the present model as follows:
let t1 denote the rate of income taxation on earnings,t2 the rate of
income taxation on unemployment insurance payments and y the subsidy or
tax rate on the actuarial premium paid by a firm.9 The firm still strives
to maximize expected utility subject to a zero expected profit condition.
Only additional parameters enter the calculations. Assuming homogeneous
workers for simplicity, we have42














u'(w(l —t1)) (6.4) u'((l -t2)+i
= (1-t2)/y(1
-t1)q.
(6.2) and (6.3) reveal that consumption is leveled withinemployment or
unemployment states. However, (6.4) shows that consumption Is inefficient
between states unless q =1.
(6.5) w(1 —t1)
—{(1—
t2)+ k] 0as q 1.
Y <1represents the actuarial subsidy inherent in the official system while
y >1represents the tax. t2=0for many workers in the present system,
so q >1is more the rule than the exception. Then, (6.5) shows that
optimal consumption Is larger when the worker is in the nonmarketsector
than in the market sector. Workers are better off whenunemployed, which
flags a potential problem with the system.
It is convenient to provide a benchmark case and focus on the role
of Income taxation. Setting y =1(actuarial insurance) we see that q =1
If t2=t1.Excessive demand for layoffs on the part of workers is43
neutralized if unemployment compensation benefits are taxed as ordinary
inconie because consumption is state—independent. Nonetheless, the firm




Comparing (6.6) with (2.5) reveals that the firm uses k/(l —t1)as the
shadow price for determining p. It shoulduse k. Labor is valued in
excess of its social opportunity cost and the firm tendsto inefficiently
undereniploy its workforce, promoting inefficient nonmarketproduction at
the expense of more efficient market production.This is akin to the
conventional distortion of income taxation on labor leisurechoices given
that nonmarket production (leisure) cannot betaxed.
In much of the existing system t2 =0and y1. Therefore,
writing t1 =t,expected utility is:
(6.7) EU =u(+ k) + [u(w(1 —t))—u(+ k)]fp(s)dG.
The constraint remains the same as in (6.1). Differentiating (6.7) subject





=u(w(1-t))—u( + k)]/u'( + k).44
The dependence of consumption upon employment status brings the risk
premium q back into the picture. q > 1 implies< 0, by (6.5): the
risk premium is negative because unemployment is the preferred state.
The shadow price of labor in the firm (using the construction analogous
to figure 1) is w —— y.Approximating (6.4) by first order Taylor
series expansion around w(l —t)reveals that the shadow price of labor
used by the firm is approximately
(6.9) (k + { -2/r](q-l)/q-fq)/(l-t)
where r is again the coefficient of absolute risk aversion evaluated at
c =w(l—t).The negative risk premium works toward an excessive
internal valuation of labor. The entire expression is sure to exceed
k if risk aversion is sufficiently large. Consequently income taxes and
UI subsidies tend to promote excessive nonmarket production and increased
measured unemployment.
We saw in section IV that the Incidence of unemployment falls
most heavily on workers with comparative advantage in home production
in an optimum unemployment insurance system and that UI payments should
fall with k. The existing system appears to at least approximate this
solution in its benefit formula. Benefits are proportional to a person's
prior covered earnings record, up to a ceiling. Most states also impose
waiting periods and all have benefit duration restrictions. All these
factors work toward reducing the benefit rate for workers with larger
home productivity or greater tastes for leisure because such workers are
likely to have smaller covered earnings records and a greater incidence
of unemployment spells as well as longer durations of spells. While this45
topic has been studied far less than the effects of income taxation and
incomplete experience rating, we might well expect less adverse conse-
quences of departures from optimal tailoring of benefits to individual
workers, because errors in official program parameters are more likely
to be "undone" In private contracts through offsetting adjustments in
other payments.
There has been much empirical work on:the effects ofTJI on measured
unemployment.'0 The estimates suggest that imperfect experience rating
and income tax distortions may increase unemployment rates by as much
as 15 percent. It should be pointed out that programs in other Western
economies have less experience rating than in the United States, so this
effect is exacerbated. The political economy of why these programs take
the form of such imperfect experience rating and income tax subsidies is
an open question.
vii. SUNMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: IS CONTRACT THEORY RELEVANT?
The main implications of this paper may be summarized as follows:
A. The Role of Transactions Costs
Existence of transactions costs promote contract equilibria in
labor markets because they lend elements of specificity to employment
relationships that make enduring commitments worthwhile. It is analytically
convenient to view this relationship as voluntary membership in a productive
"club" which shares productivity and output risks among members and redis-
tributes them across the larger economy. Insurance of this type can be
guaranteed only up to the limits of aggregate nondiversifiable risk in46
the economy. It is also limited by long term shifts in relative demands
because the degree of durability of membership is reduced. The model I
have presented identifies transactions costs with a transport sector and
restrictions on mobility. However, a long tradition of labor market
research has investigated inherent specificity through various forms of
firm specific human capital. Long term commitments also provide more
appropriate incentives for the creation of specific capital, which has
been ignored here. The main empirical claim for applicability of contract
theory lies in recent empirical evidence that a large share of employment
relationships are very durable and that at least half of all layoffs are
temporary.
A contract equilibrium is not fully efficient relative to an
"auction market" because the marginal product of labor is not equated in
all possible uses. The comparison is irrelevent in any case because
auctions are not viable forms of market organization in the presence of
transactions costs. Competition for membership and long term contracts
are the optimal forms of organization in that case. Interfirm and inter—
sector differences in marginal products persist in equilibrium and arbi-
trage is incomplete because costs of eliminating these differences
exceed the benefits of doing so. Thus a full contract labor market
supports an equilibrium level of unemployment which is efficient and
socially optimal under the circumstances.11
B. Unemployment Compensation
Unemployment insurance is complete in the pure theory of contracts.
This has been a source of misperception and error in recent writing on the47
subject. The theory is most relevant for diversifiable risk. Risk averse
workers demand full insurance to insulate consumption from firm—specific
risk and state—Independence of consumption is feasible through riskpooling
and actuarially rated insurance arrangements. Equilibrium unemployment
is not large enough when insurance is artificially restricted because
workers are not allowed to transfer consumption claims across employment
states. Nonmarket production is inefficiently suppressed when insurance
is incomplete.
Market insurance is less feasible to the extent that aggregate
shocks account for a significant fraction of total variance, or if relative
demand shocks are long term and permanent. Then contract theory loses
its predictive power because self—insurance through contingencyreserve
capital is the main mechanism for transferring consumption claims across
common states, and contracts are broken if shocks persist among firms.
Departures from actuarial principles interact with income tax
provisions to promote inefficiency in official unemployment insurance
programs. Taxation of benefits reduces excessive demand for temporary
layoffs but does not eliminate distortions caused by nontaxation of non—
market production. Volumes of evidence suggest that departures from
actuarial balance across firms promotes excessive employment instability
in the economy and may add a percentage point or two to the natural rate.
Less evidence is available on the fact that socially efficient unemploy-
ment compensation requires an inverse relationship between benefits
and home productivity among persons.
Still, contractual demands for unemployment compensation are only
part of the picture. The role of these payments in assisting permanent job48
changes, moving labor resources to their highest valued uses and smoothing
consumption over business cycles has not been integrated into most empirical
studies of unemployment insurance systems.12 Furthermore, persistent and
systematic departures from optimal features of these programs throughout
the world suggests that some factors have been omitted from our present
analysis and understanding of these programs.
C. The Value of Risk
Increasing diversifiable risk is valuable in a contractual labor
market. Availability of a productive nonmarket sector allows truncation
of the least favorable, and greater selectivity of market time to more
favorable states, similar to the value of an option. This conclusion
remains valid when home productivity is stochastic, so long as market
and nonmarket shocks are not perfectly correlated. It must be tempered
to the extent that market and nonmarket goods are imperfect substitutes.
It is obvious that the option value of truncation and selectivity is
increasing in the elasticity of substitution between market and nonmarket
goods. Increasing risk has no value if labor supply is sufficiently
inelastic.
On the other hand, increasing nondiversifiable risk has negative
value. Increasing macro risk reduces welfare because it requires larger
contingency stocks for self insurance and reduces average per capita
consumption.
The empirical counterpart of these issues lies in the measurement
of equalizing wage differences for employment risk. This problem is a
subtle and sophisticated one, since measurement should be sensitive to
the sources of risk and to personal characteristics, including home49
productivity. Estimates are few and far between, but show relatively small
risk premia after allowing for official unemploymentcompensation, suggesting
that market insurance may be reasonably complete.'3
D. Wages and Comsumption
The theory of implicit contracts has few, ifany implications about
wage rigidity. This seems so widely misunderstood that it bears special
emphasjs. The theory has plenty to say about consumption rigidity.Indeed,
the role of insurance in a contract equilibrium is to levelconsumption
across states of nature. Hence the positive predictions of the theory
are closely related to the permanent income hypothesis, and, when risks
are fully diversifiable the two are observationaily equivalent. This
theory cannot lend any support whatsoever to theories of nominalwage
rigidity, money illusion or related paraphenalia, since contracts are
written in real terms. In those forms of the theory whereconsumption
is identified with real wage and relatedpayments by firms, consumption
rIgidity carries over to real, not nominal wage rigidity.
Consumption and the allocation of time between market and non—
market uses are uniquely determined in the optimalcontract, but there
is a deeper sense in which wages are not uniquely determined because
they play no allocative economic role in the pure theory of contracts.
Insurance divorces the allocative role of prices and the distribution
of consumption across states. Existence of a contractequilibrium is
predicated on transactions costs sufficiently large to maintain unarbi—
traged productivity differences among firms. Wages therefore don't
allocate labor among market activities once durable contracts have been
struck. The only other possible role forwages is to allocate a worker's50
intensive margin of time between market and nonmarket uses. However,
the existence of layoffs appears to require indivisibilities and non—
convexities in either production or preferences that make
marginal changes in hours of a given worker nonoptimal. Instead firms
make these adjustments at the extensive margin (layoffs and rehires)
on their workers' behalf4 This of course does not deny the role of
relative changes in wages and consumption opportunities in allocating
labor across sectors of the market economy in response to longer run
changes in demand and production techniques, but that requires a
rather different type of theory.
Returning to the consumption predictions of the model, the
permanent income hypothesis needs some adjustments when load factors
render insurance incomplete, when there is macro—risk, and also when
market and nonmarket production are imperfect substitutes. Imperfect
substitution implies positive correlation between leisure and consumption,
with allowances for work—related consumption items and good—specific
complementarities with leisure in home production functions. Macro—
risk and nonactuarial premiums imply periodic departures from complete
consumption smoothing because self—insurance through savings necessarily
is incomplete.
Empirical investigations of consumption and permanent income are
too well known to require extensive coinmenatary. Recent estimates show
extra sensitivity of consumption to transitory income5 The theory here
suggests systematic differences between workers who are subject to
temporary layoff and those who have permanently lost their jobs, but the
data are not detailed enough to make these distinctions. Nor has the51
relationship between transitory Income and undiversifiable risk been
thoroughly investigated at the individual level. Empirical studies of
the consumption behavior of the unemployed show the remarkablepower of
the permanent Income hypothesis and also corroborateexcess sensitivity
of consumption to transitory Income for some workers. These dataalso
do not distinguish between workers who are ontemporary or permanent
layoff status.
E. The Incidence of Unemployment
A final empirical implication of contract theory is that
unemployment incidence is proportional to comparative advantage innon—
market relative to market production. Under general conditions itpays
firms to Integrate employment and productionamong workers with differential
comparative advantage. Those most efficient in household productionserve
ascontingency reserves whose services are employed only In the most
favorable states. Whether or not this leads to problems ofadverse selection
is not resolved at this time.
Surely the bulk of evidence is consistent with the incidence
predictions of the model. The ordering of optimum employmentpolicies
by comparative advantage is consistent with widely observedlayoff
practices by seniority in both union and nonunion firms. It helps
explain why prime age married males exhibit the lowest unemployment
rates in the population by far, why single workers are morelikely to be
unemployed than married workers, why unemployment rates of females have
been traditionally larger than those of males, andwhy unemployment among
youth exceeds that among nonyouth. To the extent that human capita1 is52
not neutral between market and nonmarket skills it may also help account
for differential incidence of unemployment by market skill, though these
issues must be qualified for production substitution possibilities among
these groups. It does less well in accounting for black—white differences,
thought it is not necessarily inconsistent with them. However, these
predictions are similar to those arising from older specific human
capital models (labor as a quasi—fixed factor) and it appears difficult
to differentiate between them.REFERENCES
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